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CRIMINAL CORRUPTION:
WHY BROAD DEFINITIONS OF BRIBERY MAKE THINGS WORSE
Albert W. Alschuler*
ABSTRACT
Although the law of bribery may look profoundly under-inclusive, the push to
expand it usually should be resisted. This article traces the history of two competing
concepts of bribery—the “intent to influence” concept (a concept initially applied only
to gifts given to judges) and the “illegal contract” concept. It argues that, if taken
literally and applied to officials other than judges, “intent to influence” is now an
unthinkable standard. The article defends the Supreme Court’s refusal to treat
campaign contributions as bribes in the absence of an “explicit” quid pro quo and its
refusal to read a statute criminalizing deprivations of “the intangible right of honest
services” as scuttling the quid pro quo requirement. While recognizing that the “stream
of benefits” metaphor can be compatible with this requirement, it cautions against
allowing the requirement to degenerate into a “one hand washes the other” or
“favoritism” standard. The article maintains that specific, ex ante regulations of the
sort commonly found in ethical codes and campaign finance regulations provide a
better way to limit corruption than bribery laws, but it warns that even these
regulations should not prohibit all practices that may be the functional equivalent of
bribery. The article concludes by speculating about whether the efforts of federal
prosecutors to reduce corruption over the past 60 years have given us better
government.

I. THE CORRUPTION DILEMMA
The scholarship of Zephyr Teachout and Lawrence Lessig has reminded
us of the classic definition of corruption.1 Corruption in its classic sense
describes something that has become impure or perverted.2 In Aristotle’s
words, “The true forms of government . . . are those in which [rulers]
*

Julius Kreeger Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology, Emeritus, the University
of Chicago.
1
See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S
SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 9, 38, 39, 41 (2014); Zephyr Teachout, The AntiCorruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC,
LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 15-20, 230-47 (2011);
Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean, 102
CAL. L. REV. 1 (2014); “Corruption,” originally, http://ocorruption.tumblr.com (undated:
“a blog collecting every use of the term ‘corruption’ among the records of the Framers.
Submitted to the Supreme Court as an appendix to an amicus brief by Lawrence Lessig for
the Constitutional Accountability Center”).
2
See Richard Mulgan, Aristotle on Legality and Corruption, in CORRUPTION:
EXPANDING THE FOCUS 25 (Manuhuia Barcham, Barry Hindess, and Peter Lamour, eds.,
2012).
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govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule
with a view to the private interest . . . are perversions.”3 New York Times
columnist Bob Herbert explains why our government fits the ancient
definition:
The corporate and financial elites threw astounding sums of
money into campaign contributions and high-priced
lobbyists and think tanks and media buys and anything else
they could think of. They wined and dined powerful leaders
of both parties. They flew them on private jets and wooed
them with golf outings and lavish vacations and gave them
high-paying jobs as lobbyists the moment they left the
government. All that money was well spent. The
investments paid off big time.4
In at least one sense, the practices Herbert decries are the functional
equivalent of bribery.5 Quid pro quo bribes produce decisions not in the
public interest—they corrupt—and unconditional contributions and gifts do
too.
Declaring that implicit agreements and understandings lie behind these
practices, however, would be too cynical. The problem is not that corrupt
agreements are left to winks and nods. Instead, with rare exceptions, there
are no agreements, express or implied. Campaign contributions and other
benefits are accompanied by hope but not by an understanding that a
recipient will provide anything in return. As Herbert says, the hope may
turn out to be justified often enough to make the contributions good
investments. Quid pro quo exchanges are rarely how corruption happens. If
a public official were to do nothing to aid one of his benefactors, the
benefactor usually would not say even to himself that the official had
3

ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 59 (Benjamin Jowett, tr.) (Forgotten Books ed. 2007).
Bob Herbert, When Democracy Weakens, NY TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011, at A21.
5
Many people, including former president Jimmy Carter, former governor Jesse
Ventura, and former lobbyist and prisoner Jack Abramoff, have described our campaign
finance system as one of legalized bribery. See Ray Henry, Jimmy Carter: Unchecked
Political Contributions Are “Legal Bribery”, HUFFINGTON POST, July 17, 2013,
http://www.huffintonpost.com/2013/07/17/jimmy-carter-bribery_n_3611882.html; Bruno J.
Navarro, Jesse Ventura Likens Politics to Bribery, CNBC, June 19, 2012,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/47883494; LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 1, at 8 (quoting
Jack Abramoff: “I was participating in a system of legalized bribery. All of it is bribery,
every bit of it.”); Thomas L. Friedman, Calling America: Hello? Hello? Hello? Hello?,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2013, at SR11 (“[O]ur Congress has become a forum for legalized
bribery”); Editorial: The Line at the “Super PAC” Trough, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2014, at
SR 10 (“This election year will be the moment when individual candidate super PACs—a
form of legalized bribery—will become a truly toxic force in American politics.”).
4
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broken an implicit promise.
When the goal is to root out Aristotelian corruption, the law of bribery,
extortion, and fraud looks profoundly under-inclusive. The push of
prosecutors, judges, journalists, and reformers to expand this law is easily
understood. The thesis of this article, however, is that the push usually
should be resisted. America can better achieve James Madison’s “wish that
the national legislature be as uncorrupt as possible”6 through specific, ex
ante regulations—what Zephyr Teachout calls structural or prophylactic
rules.7 These regulations include, in particular, campaign-finance
limitations of the sort today’s Supreme Court strikes down, gratuity
prohibitions, and ethical codes forbidding the creation of some conflicts of
interest. Trying to block all functional equivalents of bribery even through
specific, ex ante regulations, however, would do more harm than good.
II. TWO DEFINITIONS OF BRIBERY
A. “Intent to Influence” Bribery
1. The Basic Standard
On first reading, federal bribery statutes appear to make felons of
everyone who supplies the kind of benefits Bob Herbert describes. So do
the bribery statutes of nearly one-third of the states. These statutes forbid
giving, offering or promising anything of value to an official with intent to
influence an official act. Some of them, including the two principal federal
bribery statutes, add the word “corruptly”; they forbid “corruptly” offering a
benefit with intent to influence.8 Other statutes, however, leave this word
out,9 and federal bribery statutes did not include it until 1962.10 At least
with the adverb set aside, “intent to influence” statutes appear to make a
criminal of every lobbyist who buys lunch for a legislator and of every
campaign contributor who hopes that his contribution will make its
recipient more sympathetic to his interests.
The “intent to influence” statutes took their standard from the English

6

3 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 261 n.1 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1902) (The Journal
of the Constitutional Convention).
7
See TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 4, 284-87.
8
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (bribery); 18 U.S.C. § 666 (federal program bribery);
Fla. Stat. § 838.015 (2014); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-210 (2013).
9
See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 97-11-11 (App. 113a) (2014); La. R.S. § 14:118 (2013);
Wis. Stat. § 946.10 (2014).
10
See, e.g., An Act to Codify, Revise, and Amend the Penal Laws of the United States
§§ 111-12, 117, 35 Stat. 1088, 1108-09, 1109-10 (1909).
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common law.11 Both this law and the earliest bribery statutes, however,
applied it only to benefits provided to judges.12 Congress enacted its first
general prohibition of bribery in 1853—a time when Aristotelian ideals of
impartiality and public service were taken so seriously that paid lobbying
was considered contrary to public policy and sometimes made a crime.13
Borrowing language that once had applied only to the corruption of
judges,14 the 1853 statute forbade both “bribes” and “presents” when they
were given “with intent to influence” federal officials.15 Congress no doubt
meant these words just the way they sound.
Some courts still take the words “intent to influence” literally. The Fifth
Circuit, for example, denied a defendant’s request for an instruction that
Louisiana’s “intent to influence” statute did not forbid “gifts made for
customary business reasons.” Giving such an instruction, the court said,
“would be a rank misapplication of the Louisiana bribery law. Customary
business practices could embrace all sorts of extravagant favors intended to
influence important business decisions.”16
2. The Adverb
The Louisiana bribery statute construed by the Fifth Circuit did not
include the word “corruptly,” and perhaps the court would have reached a
different result if it had. A statute that forbids corruptly giving a benefit
with intent to influence seems to acknowledge that not all benefits given
with intent to influence are improper. Perhaps the word “corruptly” is
11

See TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 118.
See id. at 103-04, 111; Act of April 30, 1790, Ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 117 (a bribery
statute applicable only to judges). By 1798, a federal statute forbade bribing a federal
“Judge, an Officer of the Customs, or an Officer of the Excise.” Whether federal courts
could convict people not covered by this statute of common law bribery was disputed. See
United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. 384, 390 (C.C. Pa. 1798). In England, when officials other
than judges took bribes, the common law could convict them of extortion. A bribe giver,
however, could not be convicted of this crime. See James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction
Between Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 U.C.L.A. L.
REV 815 (1988).
13
See TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 144-73. At least one
court also held that political logrolling could be prosecuted as a common law misdemeanor.
The court said that logrolling violated an official’s duty “to vote in reference only to the
merits.” Commonwealth v. Callaghan, 4 Va. 460, 463 (1825).
14
The first federal bribery statute forbade giving any money “or any other bribe,
present or reward . . . to obtain or procure the opinion, judgment or decree of any judge or
judges of the United States.” Act of April 30, 1790, Ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 117.
15
Act of Feb. 26, 1853, Ch. 81 § 6, 10 Stat. 171.
16
United States v. L’Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 808 (5th Cir. 1980). A federal prosecutor
could charge a violation of the Louisiana statute because bribery in violation of state law is
a RICO predicate. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
12
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crucial, and perhaps it does most of the work. This fudgy adverb might
prevent “intent to influence” statutes from sweeping into their net the
lobbyist’s lunch, other routine entertainment, and many campaign
contributions.
When a federal statute uses a word that had an established meaning at
common law, courts presume that Congress meant the word to retain this
meaning.17 Common law extortion (which included accepting but not giving
bribes18) required a “corrupt” intent. The English courts, however, did not
use the word in the same way Aristotle (or his translators and interpreters)
did.
From the thirteenth through the late eighteenth centuries, officials in
England were entitled to collect statutory dues and customary fees for
services, and the line between legitimate fee collection and extortion was
sometimes murky. The courts declared that officials acted corruptly only
when they realized they were not entitled to the fees they collected.
“Corruptly” meant deliberately acting in violation of positive law or
established norms of legitimate official conduct.19
Judge Kozinski’s reading of the word “corruptly” in a federal bribery
statute echoed the common law. In a dissenting opinion in the Ninth Circuit,
he wrote, “Conduct is corrupt if it’s an improper way for a public official to
benefit from his job. But what’s improper turns on many different factors,
such as tradition, context and current attitudes about legitimate rewards for
particular officeholders.”20 Kozinski added that corruption “can’t be easily
captured in a single formula, as it varies too much from situation to
situation.”21
Federal juries never hear an explanation of the word “corruptly” like
Judge Kozinski’s. Many courts see the word as doing no work at all. They
have made it redundant by declaring that a person acts corruptly whenever
his conduct and mental state establish the other elements of bribery. The
17
See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (quoting several earlier
decisions).
18
See Lindgren, supra note , at 821 (“Bribery behavior was routinely punished as
common law extortion.”). The Supreme Court relied on Lindgren’s scholarship when it
held that the Hobbs Act, a federal extortion statute, punishes bribery. See Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255, 260 (1992); id. at 281-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Whatever the
merits of [Lindgren’s] argument as a description of early English common law, it is beside
the point here—the critical inquiry for our purposes is the American understanding of the
crime at the time the Hobbs Act was passed in 1946.”).
19
See Note (Jeremy N. Gayed), “Corruptly”: Why Corrupt State of Mind is an
Essential Element for Hobbs Act Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 78 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1731, 1731 (2003); Rex v. Vaughn, 98 Eng. Rep. 308, 308 (K.B. 1769) (requiring
knowledge that the defendant had engaged in an “unjustifiable transaction.”).
20
United States v. Dorri, 15 F.3d 888, 894 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
21
Id.
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Second Circuit, for example, appeared to make felons of all lunch-buying
lobbyists when it approved the following instruction: “[A] person acts
corruptly . . . when he gives or offers to give something of value intending
to influence . . . a government agent in connection with his official acts.”22
The Seventh Circuit held that omitting the word “corruptly” from jury
instructions altogether was not plain error because “nothing in the 1962
addition of the word ‘corrupt’ enlarge[d] the meaning of intent as an
essential element of the offense.”23
Courts that do not make the word “corruptly” redundant typically define
it in language that is just as fudgy, open-ended, and evaluative as the term
itself. They use the words improper, wrongful, evil, and bad. They say that
corruption refers to an “improper motive or purpose,”24 an “intent to obtain
an improper advantage for oneself or someone else,”25 a “wrongful or
dishonest intent,”26 a “bad purpose or evil motive,”27 or a “wrongful design
to acquire or cause some pecuniary or other advantage.”28
Even on Judge Kozinski’s interpretation, the word “corruptly” is
vague.29 “Intent to influence” statutes seem to require normative evaluation
as well as fact-finding and mind-reading.30 These statutes are relics of a
22

United States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1995).
United States v. Medley, 913 F.2d 1248, 1261 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States
v. Isa, 452 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 1971)). But see Agan v. Vaughn, 119 F.3d 1538, 154245 (11th Cir. 1997) (indicating that the court would have held unconstitutional a Georgia
statute that prohibits giving campaign contributions with intent to influence if the state
courts had not read into this statute a requirement that the contribution be given
“corruptly”).
24
See United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting jury
instruction).
25
United States v. McDade, 827 F. Supp. 1153, 1186 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (quoting United
States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 881 (D.C. Cir. 990)).
26
Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566, 573 (1st Cir. 1996).
27
United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 446 (5th Cir. 2007).
28
United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 806 (9th Cir. 1999). Courts also say that acting
corruptly means acting “with the purpose, at least in part, of accomplishing either an
unlawful end result, or a lawful end result by some unlawful method or means.” See
SEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL @ 18 U.S.C. § 201. Someone
must have worked hard to create this ponderous way of saying that the accused must have
intended to do something unlawful.
29
In fact, the D.C. Circuit held the word too vague to give fair notice to a defendant
accused, not of giving a bribe, but of corruptly influencing Congress by lying to a
Congressional committee. The court observed that many people attempt to influence
Congress and that they are entitled to more notice of the line between proper and improper
conduct than the word “corruptly” supplies. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369,
384-86 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
30
It is sometimes said that the criminal law cares about an actor’s intention but not his
motive. It’s enough, for example, that a defendant charged with homicide meant to kill; it
doesn’t matter why he did it. But “intent to influence” statutes focus on motive. It is not
23
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time when crimes were defined far less precisely than they usually are
today, when juries rather than prosecutors resolved criminal cases, and
when Americans had extraordinary faith in the ability of juries to determine
whether defendants deserved punishment.31
3. The Bribe Taker’s Mental State
“Intent to influence” describes the mental state of someone who gives a
bribe. Courts and legislatures have used other language to describe the
mental state of the person who takes it.
Instructions sometimes tell juries that the alleged bribe-taker’s
knowledge of the donor’s intent to influence is enough.32 These instructions
seem to make a bribe-taker of every official who allows a lobbyist to buy
him lunch. If the official is awake, he surely must realize that the lobbyist
intends to influence him. The Second Circuit, however, reversed a
conviction after the trial court had given an instruction of this sort. The
court quoted the language of the applicable statute, which focused on the
defendant’s own motives rather than his knowledge of the other guy’s: “[A]
recipient’s knowledge of a donor’s intent to influence is insufficient to
support conviction. The recipient must take the proffered thing of value
‘intending to be influenced.’”33
In fact, few bribe takers want to be influenced. What a bribe taker wants
is a bribe, and he may regret that being influenced is the only way to get it.
“Intending to be influenced” probably means “knowing that one will be
influenced.”
sufficient that a defendant deliberately gave a thing of value to a pubic official. Someone
must figure out why he did it.
31
See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 39, 14041 (2011); Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury
in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 902-11 (1994).
32
See, e.g., United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 698 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting the trial
court’s instruction that the receipt of a personal or financial benefit “violates the law only if
the benefit was received with the public official’s understanding that it was given to
influence his decision-making”); United States v. Gorny, 732 F.2d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 1984)
(noting the trial court’s instruction that “[t]he crime is completed when the property or
personal advantage is accepted by the public employee knowing that it was offered with
intent that he act favorably to the person offering the property or personal advantage when
necessary”); McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 261 n.4 (1991) (noting an
instruction that the jury must be “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the payment . .
. was made . . . with the expectation that such payment would influence McCormick’s
official conduct, and with the knowledge on the part of McCormick that they were paid to
him with that expectation”).
33
United States v. Ford, 435 F.3d 204, 214 n.5 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
666(a)(1)(B)).
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Whether the word “intent” refers to purpose or knowledge, the statutory
language noted by the Second Circuit seems to validate two implausible
defenses: (1) “I did not intend to be influenced because I never meant to
keep my promise.” And (2) “I did not intend to be influenced because I
already had made up my mind. I simply agreed to do what I would have
done anyway.”
The second defense resembles an argument Sir Francis Bacon offered
when he was tried for bribery in 1621. Bacon, the Lord Chancellor of
England as well as a path-breaking philosopher and inventor of modern
science, claimed that he had never allowed any of the bribes allegedly given
by litigants to influence him. In fact, he said, he often ruled against the
alleged bribe-giver.34 Although the House of Lords convicted Bacon, he
might have been more successful if he had been tried under 18 U.S.C. §
666, an “intent to be influenced” federal bribery statute.
Certainly U Po Kyin, George Orwell’s fictional Sub-Division
Magistrate of Kyauktada in Upper Burma, would escape conviction if § 666
were taken literally. Kyin always took bribes from both sides to ensure that
he would decide the cases before him on strictly legal grounds. 35 Kyin did
not intend to be influenced, did not know that he would be influenced, and
was not in fact influenced. His case may indicate, however, that § 666 must
mean something other than what it says.
The other major federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), is somewhat
less troublesome. It says that a public official may not corruptly demand,
seek, receive, accept, or agree to receive or accept anything of value in
return for being influenced in the performance of any official act. An
official who does not mean to keep his promise might nevertheless agree to
accept a thing of value in return for being influenced. Perhaps this official
could be convicted under § 201(b) even if he could not be convicted under §
666. Like an official charged with violating § 666, however, an official
charged with violating § 201(b) could defend by saying, “I agreed to vote in
favor of the Widget Subsidies Act in return for cash, but I never agreed to
be influenced. I had decided to support widget subsidies long before I took
the money.”

34
See PETER ZAGORIN, FRANCIS BACON 22 (1999). Seeking the king’s intervention
while his case was pending, Bacon wrote James I that he never had a “bribe or reward in
my eye or thought when I pronounced any sentence or order.” JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.,
BRIBES 352 (1984). Some modern observers maintain that Bacon was bum-rapped by Sir
Edward Coke and other political opponents, but Noonan, who provides a full account of his
case, makes clear that he was not. See id. at 334-65.
35
GEORGE ORWELL, BURMESE DAYS 7 (1934).
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B. “Illegal Contract” Bribery
Someone who contributes to an official’s reelection campaign or gives
his daughter a nice wedding present may hope to curry the official’s favor.
This conduct may indeed influence the official, and critics may call it the
functional equivalent of bribery. Few, however, would describe this conduct
as bribery itself. It certainly is not the sort of behavior that should expose
someone to imprisonment for 15 or 20 years.36 The Seventh Circuit has
commented, “Vague expectations of some future benefit should not be
sufficient to make a payment a bribe.”37 As the word is most commonly
used today, “bribery” probably denotes an actual or contemplated exchange
of something of value for favorable governmental action, not simply a
unilateral act intended to make favorable governmental action more likely.
In 1962, a commentary to the American Law Institute’s Model Penal
Code declared that the code’s definition of bribery would preclude
“application of the bribery sanction to situations where gifts are given in the
mere hope of influence.”38 The MPC defines bribery as offering, giving,
soliciting, or accepting a pecuniary benefit as “consideration” for an official
act.39 As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals said of a Texas bribery
statute modeled on this provision, the MPC “requir[es] a bilateral
arrangement—in effect an illegal contract to exchange a benefit as
consideration for the performance of an official function.”40
The words “bilateral arrangement” in the Texas court’s formulation
might be misleading. Like “intent to influence” bribery, “illegal contract”
bribery can be committed by an individual acting alone. The crime includes
offers and solicitations, and it also includes transactions in which one party
merely feigns agreement. An offender, however, must seek a bargain with

36
The maximum penalty for bribery under federal law is 15 years. See 18 U.S.C. §
201(b). But bribe-taking can also be prosecuted as honest-services fraud, and the maximum
penalty for this crime is usually is 20 years. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346; text at notes
infra.
37
United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 411 (7th Cir. 1993).
38
MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1 note on status of section (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
39
Id. § 240.1(1).
40
McCallum v. State, 686 S.W.2d 132, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
In Garrett v. McCotter, 807 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 482), the Fifth Circuit noted “that the
Texas Legislature intentionally replaced ‘with intent to influence’ with ‘any benefit in
consideration for’ in order to avoid application of the bribery sanction to situations where
gifts are given in mere hope of influence.” Because this “change in language was intended
to stiffen the requirements for a bribery conviction,” an indictment that described the crime
as giving a benefit with intent to influence did not charge an offense under Texas law. Id. at
485.
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another person.41 How the other person responds does not matter; the statute
punishes attempted as well as completed exchanges. More than two-thirds
of the states have followed MPC’s lead and now embrace the “illegal
contract” concept of bribery.42
C. The Federal Amalgam
Federal bribery statutes use the words “intent to influence,” but the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of these words has transformed them. With
a shoehorn and a shove, the Court has fit the “illegal contract” concept of
bribery into these “intent to influence” statutes. The Court wrote in Sun41

At least when the alleged bribe consists of something other than a campaign
contribution, see text at notes infra, the agreement need not be express. In United States v.
Gorny, 732 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1984), for example, an official hearing challenges to tax
assessments accepted payments from lawyers who practiced before him. The payments
included a $4000 “referral fee” although the official provided no referral, $500 in cash
passed in a white envelope under the table at a restaurant, and another $1000 passed in the
men’s room of a private club.
“Unlike some of [his] predecessors,” the Seventh Circuit reported, the defendant in
Gorny “did not receive payments based on the outcome of any specific case nor was the
amount he received based on a percentage reduction of an assessment.” Id. at 599. His
benefactors, however, “enjoyed an unusually high rate of success in their practice before
the Board.” One of them won 80% of his cases and another 93% although the average rate
of success was only 35%. Id. at 600.
The defendant in Gorny apparently made no promises out loud, and what cases he
would fix remained unspecified. Everyone understood what the payments were for,
however, and the defendant provided it by ruling in favor of his benefactors at a high rate.
A jury easily could have inferred that, at the time he accepted each payment, the defendant
agreed implicitly to provide a governmental benefit in return.
Of course the line between currying favor and seeking an implicit agreement is fuzzy.
One might ask whether the alleged bribe giver could legitimately have felt cheated rather
than simply disappointed if the alleged bribe taker had never done anything for him. Could
the donor plausibly have said to the recipient, “We never spelled it out, but we did have an
understanding”?
42
See United States v. Biaggi, 674 F. Supp. 86, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing 38 state
statutes). One state has approved an “illegal contract” definition of bribery for bribe takers
and an “intent to influence” definition for bribe givers. See MCLS § 750.118 (2014) (part
of a Michigan criminal code enacted in 1931) (making it a crime to accept a benefit “under
an agreement, or with an understanding that [the accepting official’s] vote, opinion, or
judgment shall be given in any particular manner, or on a particular side of any question”);
MCLS § 750.117 (2014) (making it a crime to corruptly give any valuable thing with the
purpose of influencing official action). Zephyr Teachout’s statement that “most states have
not adopted a quid pro quo requirement for any of their bribery laws” seems correct only in
the sense that most states do not use the Latin words. See TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN
AMERICA, supra note 1, at 240. Requiring that a benefit be offered or accepted as
“consideration” for favorable governmental action is no different from requiring a quid pro
quo.
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Diamond Growers v. United States,43 “Bribery requires intent ‘to influence’
an official act or ‘to be influenced’ in an official act . . . . In other words, for
bribery there must be a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give or receive
something of value in exchange for an official act.”44
“Intent to influence” and “exchange” are not different words for the
same thing. Some of the 179 people who “bundled” more than $500,000
apiece for President Obama’s 2012 reelection campaign45 undoubtedly
hoped to influence governmental action—perhaps by increasing the
likelihood of their own appointment as ambassadors.46 One would be
surprised, however, to learn of any quid pro quo or corrupt understanding at
the time they gave their support. As courts have recognized, giving
something with a “generalized hope of ultimate benefit on the part of the
donor” is not a bribe.47
The Supreme Court might better have grounded its quid pro quo
requirement on the word “corruptly.” Norms have changed since Congress
enacted its first general bribery statute in 1853,48 and many benefits
intended to influence are not seen as improper today. Before the Supreme
Court declared that “intent to influence” and “quid pro quo” meant the same
thing, a few lower courts had in fact found a quid pro quo requirement in
the word “corruptly.”49
Under the Supreme Court’s decisions, a quid pro quo usually can be
43

526 U.S. 398 (1999).
Sun-Diamond Growers v. United States, 526 U.S 398, 404-05 (emphasis in the
original).
45
See Center for Responsive Politics, Meet the Bundlers Behind the Money,
https://s3.amazonaws.com/assets.opensecrets.org/pres12/img/bundlers.png (last visited
Dec. 27, 2014). President Obama’s opponent, Governor Romney, did not reveal how many
people “bundled” more than $500,000 for his campaign. No law required him to do so.
46
See Max Fisher, This Very Telling Map Shows Which Ambassadors Were Campaign
Bundlers,
WASH
POST,
Feb.
10,
2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/10/this-very-telling-mapshows-which-u-s-ambassadors-were-campaign-bundlers/ (noting that “23 current U.S.
ambassadors or ambassadorial nominees . . . were also major campaign-donation
bundlers”).
47
See United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Johnson, 621 F.2d 1073, 1076 (10th Cir. 1980).
48
See text at notes supra.
49
See United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1978) (declaring that the
term “corrupt intent” incorporates an element of quid pro quo bribery and adding that the
quid pro quo element “distinguishes the heightened criminal intent requisite under the
bribery sections of [§ 201] from the simple mens rea required for violation of the gratuity
sections”); United States v. Muldoon, 931 F.2d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 1991) (declaring that the
“corrupt intent” required by § 201 is an intent “to receive some benefit in return for
payment”); United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1015 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[C]ourts
equate ‘corrupt intent’ with intent to engage in a relatively specific quid pro quo.”).
44
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implied rather than express. In McCormick v. United States,50 however, the
Court held that campaign contributions may be treated as bribes only when
“the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by
the official to perform or not to perform an official act.”51 Although the
Eleventh Circuit has concluded (dubiously) that a later Supreme Court
decision modified McCormick,52 at least six other courts of appeals insist
that an explicit agreement remains necessary.53
McCormick did not rest its requirement of an “explicit” quid pro quo on
the language of the statute.54 The case arose under an extortion statute, the
Hobbs Act, which federal courts had construed to reach bribe-taking
although its language simply forbade obtaining property “under color of
official right.”55 Without parsing this language, the Court emphasized the
danger of allowing prosecutors and jurors to infer corrupt bargains from the
conduct of campaign contributors and elected officials. It said that Congress
would be required to speak clearly if it wished to demand less than an
explicit agreement:
To hold otherwise would open to prosecution not only
conduct that has long been thought to be well within the law
but also conduct that in a very real sense is unavoidable so
long as election campaigns are financed by private
contributions. It would require statutory language more
specific than the Hobbs Act contains to justify a contrary
conclusion.56
Although the Supreme Court embraced the “illegal contract” concept of
50

500 U.S. 257 (1991).
Id. at 273. The trial court had given an “intent to influence” instruction. The
Supreme Court reversed because, at least in a case involving campaign contributions, this
sort of instruction is erroneous.
52
See United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1171 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992)).
53
See United States v. Turner, 684 F.3d 244, 253-54, 258 (1st Cir. 2012); United
States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d
245, 256-61 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 515-19 (6th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 971-72 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. KincaidChauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2009).
54
See McCormick, 500 U.S. at 277 (Scalia, J., concurring) (declaring that the statute
“contains not even a colorable allusion to . . . quid pro quos”).
55
See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)(2).
56
Id. at 272-73. Justice Thomas later observed, “We . . . imposed [the quid pro quo
requirement] to prevent the Hobbs Act from effecting a radical (and absurd) change in
American political life.” Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 286 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
51
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bribery in 1991, pattern jury instructions in most circuits continue to recite
the language of federal bribery statutes without elaboration. Juries rarely
hear the words quid pro quo or the words express, implied, or agreement.
They hear only that bribe givers and bribe takers must intend to influence or
to be influenced.57 Many defense attorneys are so inept that they fail to
complain about these instructions. Especially from the perspective of the
jury box, the federal law of bribery is a muddle.
III. EFFORTS TO BEND, BREAK, OR CIRCUMVENT
THE QUID PRO QUO REQUIREMENT
Because federal bribery statutes as construed by the Supreme Court fall
far short of proscribing every functional equivalent of bribery, prosecutors,
lower court judges, legislators, and other corruption fighters look for ways
to stretch or get around them. The Supreme Court sometimes seems to be
engaged in a tug of war with everyone else.
A. Honest Services Fraud
Particularly in the 1970s, prosecutors persuaded the lower federal courts
that the federal mail fraud statute forbade schemes to deprive the public of
“the intangible right of honest services.” In 1987, however, the Supreme
Court held that this statute outlawed depriving people of property, not an illdefined intangible right of honest services.58
The Justice Department then complained to Congress that the Court had
deprived it of an important tool in its battle against corruption. Congress
responded by enacting a statute that read in full, “For the purposes of this
chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or

57
See, e.g., FIFTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) 114, 117,
186-87 (2012), available at http://www.lb5.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/; PATTERN
CRIMINAL FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 117, 179 (1998),
available at https://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern_Jury_Instr/pjury.pdf; MANUAL OF
MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
153,
191,
195
(2014),
available
at
http://juryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/criminal_instructions.htm; ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) 121, 189 (2010), available at
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/courtdocs/clk/FormCriminalPatternJuryIns
truction.pdf. But see U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, MODEL CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS at 6.18.201B1 (2004) (requiring the jury to find that the defendant
acted “corruptly with the intent to influence an official act, that is, to give [a specified thing
of
value]
in
exchange
for
an
official
act”),
available
at
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/Chap%206%20Bribery.pdf.
58
See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
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artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”59
This statute enabled lower federal court judges, like the priests of
ancient Delphi, to explicate language ordinary mortals could not
understand.60 In United States v. Sawyer61 and United States v.
Woodward,62 for example, the First Circuit upheld the convictions of a
lobbyist who had lavishly entertained a legislator and of the legislator
himself. The well-entertained legislator had supported almost all of the
lobbyist’s agenda. After noting that bribery was an established category of
honest services fraud, the court announced that it would expand this
category “from quid pro quo bribery, to include a more generalized pattern
of gratuities to coax ‘ongoing favorable official action.’”63 It said that juries
should be instructed that it is lawful for lobbyists to entertain legislators to
cultivate “business or personal friendship” but felonious for them to do so
“to cause the recipient to alter her official acts.”64 The court observed that
the benefits it made criminal “may not be very different, except in degree,
from routine cultivation of friendship in a lobbying context.”65
The First Circuit grounded its rulings in Sawyer and Woodward on the
legislator’s failure to disclose the conflict of interest created by his
relationship with the lobbyist:
A public official has an affirmative duty to disclose material
information to the public employer. When an official fails to
disclose a personal interest in a matter over which she has
decision-making power, the public is deprived of its right either
to disinterested decision making itself or, as the case may be, to
full disclosure as to the official's potential motivation.66

59

18 U.S.C. § 1346.
A panel of the Second Circuit held the honest-services statute too vague to give fair
notice to defendants, United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2002), but the en
banc Second Circuit set this ruling aside. United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.
2003). Other courts also rejected vagueness challenges to the statute. See, e.g., United
States v. Hausmann, 345 F.3d 952, 558 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d
933, 941 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769, 776-77 (5th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 370-71 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Frega, 179
F.3d 793, 803 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1109 n.29 (10th Cir.
2003); United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 568 (11th Cir. 1995). Most federal judges
apparently believed they could figure out what the statute meant.
61
85 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996).
62
149 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1998).
63
Id. at 55 (quoting Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 730).
64
Id. If you wish to guffaw at the court’s purported distinction, be my guest.
65
Id.
66
Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 724.
60
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Punishing undisclosed conflicts of interest may sound like a fine idea, at
least when the idea goes by fast. A conflicting interest, however, is any
interest that might divert an official from faithful service to the public.
When the official’s decision will benefit a member of his family, he has a
conflict of interest. When his decision will benefit a business partner or
good friend, he again has a conflict. When his decision will benefit an
important political supporter, he has a conflict. When his decision will
benefit a lobbyist who has taken him on golf outings, he once more has a
conflict. When this official’s action will benefit anyone at all who done any
favor for which he is grateful, he has a conflict of interest. Conflicts are
ubiquitous.67
No official could compile a list of all his conflicts, and if he could, he
would not know where to post it. How does one go about disclosing a
conflict of interest to a disembodied public employer? Would a “my
conflicts” section on the official’s Facebook page be sufficient? When no
official ever has or ever could disclose every conflict, criminalizing
undisclosed conflicts looks like a way to enable prosecutors to pick their
targets.68
The Supreme Court did not consider the meaning or the constitutionality
of the honest services statute until 22 years after its enactment. Then, in
2010, in Skilling v. United States,69 three justices declared in a concurring
opinion that they would hold the statute unconstitutionally vague,70 and the
remaining justices acknowledged that the defendant’s “vagueness challenge
has force.”71 The majority concluded, however, that the statute could be
saved by confining it to a “solid core” that every lower court had
recognized.72 “[H]onest-services fraud does not encompass conduct more
wide-ranging than the paradigmatic cases of bribes and kickbacks,” the

67
Show me a public official without conflicts of interest, and I will show you an
official without any social life, work life, family life, religious life, or political life.
68
Cf. United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2009)
(Berzon, J., concurring) (“The conflict of interest theory, unhinged from an external
disclosure standard, places too potent a tool in the hands of zealous prosecutors who may
be guided by their own political motivations . . . [and who] might also feel political
pressure to pursue certain state or local officials.”).
A court or legislature can reduce the reach of a prohibition of undisclosed conflicts by
requiring that an official’s non-disclosure violate a federal, state, or local reporting
requirement. This limitation, however, poses problems of its own. See Albert W. Alschuler,
Terrible Tools for Prosecutors: Notes on Senator Leahy’s Proposal to “Fix” Skilling v.
United States, 67 S.M.U. L. REV. 501, 513-17 (2014).
69
561 U.S. 358 (2010).
70
See id. at 415 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas and Kennedy, JJ., concurring).
71
Id. at 405 (majority opinion).
72
Id. at 407.
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Court said.73 “[N]o other misconduct falls within [the statute’s] province.”74
The Court not only rejected the government’s argument that the statute
criminalized failing to disclose a conflict of interest but also warned
Congress that a statute embracing this standard might be held
unconstitutional.75
Senator Patrick Leahy, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, promptly declared that the Supreme Court had “sided with an
Enron executive convicted of fraud” and “undermined Congressional efforts
to protect hardworking Americans from powerful interests.”76 In 2012, the
Senate approved without noticeable opposition a Leahy-sponsored proposal
to restore 20-year penalties for some undisclosed conflicts of interest. 77 The
House Judiciary Committee unanimously approved this proposal as well,78
but the majority leader of the House never brought it to a vote.79 Because
Congress failed to enact the Leahy proposal, the post-Skilling honest
services statute remains compatible with the Supreme Court’s quid pro quo
requirement, at least for now. The Supreme Court may be winning the tug
of war.
B. “Stream of Benefits” or “Course of Conduct” Bribery
In United States v. Kemp,80 the Third Circuit upheld a jury instruction
declaring, “[W]here there is a stream of benefits given by a person to favor
a public official, . . . it need not be shown that any specific benefit was
given in exchange for a specific official act.”81 In United States v. KincaidChauncey,82 the Ninth Circuit declared that accepting a “retainer” with “the
understanding that when the payor comes calling, the government official
will do whatever is asked” is bribery.83 In United States v. Whitfield,84 the
73

Id. at 411.
Id. at 412.
75
Id. at 411 n.44.
76
Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, RESTORING KEY TOOLS TO COMBAT FRAUD
AND CORRUPTION AFTER THE SUPREME COURT’S SKILLING DECISION, HEARING BEFORE
THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY at 1, 111th Cong. (2010).
77
See Congress Moves on Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2012, at A20. I criticize Senator
Leahy’s proposal in Alschuler, supra note .
78
See CLEAN UP GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2011, H.R. REP. NO. 112-688 (2012), available
at beta.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/2572/summary.
79
See Seung Min Kim, Eric Cantor Under Fire for STOCK Act Tweaks, POLITICO,
Feb. 8, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72624.html.
80
500 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2007).
81
Id. at 281.
82
556 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2009).
83
Id. at 943.
84
590 F.3d. 325 (5th Cir. 2009).
74

17

DEFINING BRIBERY

[January 26, 2015]

Fifth Circuit said, “[A] particular, specified act need not be identified at the
time of payment to satisfy the quid pro quo requirement, so long as the
payor and payee agreed upon a specific type of action to be taken in the
future.”85 In United States v. Jennings,86 the Fourth Circuit observed, “[T]he
intended exchange in bribery can be ‘this for these’ or ‘these for these,’ not
just ‘this for that.’”87 And in United States v. Ganim,88 the Second Circuit
wrote, “[S]o long as the jury finds that an official accepted gifts in exchange
for a promise to perform official acts for the giver, it need not find that the
specific act to be performed was identified at the time of the promise.”89
These declarations seem inconsistent with two descriptions of bribery
by the Supreme Court. The Court wrote in Evans v. United States,90 “The
offense is complete at the time when the public official receives a payment
in return for his engagement to perform specific official acts.”91 It added in
Sun-Diamond Growers v. United States92 that, at least under 18 U.S.C. §
201(b), a bribe must be given “for or because of some particular official
act.”93 These statements have led bribery defendants to argue that the
government failed to identify any “particular official act” or “specific
official act” they agreed to perform. Even if they agreed in general terms do
something helpful to their benefactors, the “something” remained
unspecified.
As best I can tell, these defendants have never been successful.94 For
them, the Supreme Court’s statements have been a snare and a delusion. In
bribery as in baseball, there appears to be no good reason why a transaction
may not include a player to be named later. If a public official named Genie
were to agree to grant three wishes in exchange for a deposit to her Cayman
Islands bank account, she surely should be convicted of bribery. Moreover,
an agreement to provide unspecified benefits need not be express. A corrupt
agreement sometimes can be inferred simply from the regular flow of

85

Id. at 350 (emphasis in the original).
160 F.3d 1006 (4th Cir. 1998).
87
Id. at 1014.
88
510 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2007).
89
Id. at 147.
90
504 U.S. 255 (1992).
91
Id. at 268 (emphasis added).
92
526 U.S. 398 (1999).
93
Id. at 405-06 (emphasis added). See also McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257,
273 (1991) (declaring that campaign contributions may be treated as bribes only when an
official has made an “explicit promise or undertaking . . . to perform or not perform an
official act”).
94
In addition to the court of appeals decisions cited above, see United States v. Abbey,
560 F.3d 513, 519-22 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183, 1190 (7th
Cir. 1997); and United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1186-91 (11th Cir. 2010).
86
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benefits in both directions.95
The principal danger of the “stream of benefits” concept of bribery is
nearly the opposite of the one defendants have suggested. It is not that
prosecutors and juries may fail to identify precisely the action a public
official agreed to perform. It is that they may fail to identify any benefit an
official accepted in exchange for a promise of official action. Although the
“stream of benefits” metaphor can be compatible with the quid pro quo
requirement, it invites slippage from this requirement to a “one hand washes
the other” or “favoritism” standard.
Every definition of bribery looks to the moment a benefit is received.
Bribery can be committed before this moment—the crime includes offers
and solicitations—but it cannot be committed after. A payment cannot
become a bribe retrospectively—not even when its recipient later acts to
benefit its donor, not even when the recipient is motivated in whole or in
part by gratitude to the donor, and not even when the recipient hopes to
encourage further favors. As Justice Stevens wrote in a dissenting opinion,
“When the petitioner took the money, he was either guilty or not guilty.”96
Words and actions that follow the receipt of a benefit may supply evidence
of what the donor and recipient intended when it was received, but they
cannot transform a benefit that was lawful at that moment into a bribe.
Some bribery statutes proscribe giving or accepting benefits with intent
to influence. Others proscribe giving or accepting benefits as
“consideration” for official acts. Under either definition, favoritism
following the receipt of a benefit is not bribery; cronyism is not bribery;
“steering” contracts is not bribery; and “one hand washes the other” is not
bribery. These things are not good government. They are corrupt in the
classic Aristotelian sense of the word. They sometimes may be the result of
bribery and sometimes may evidence bribery. But they are not bribery. If an
official were subject to imprisonment whenever a jury could be persuaded
that he had acted deliberately to benefit someone who once did a favor for
him, only a fool would take the job. The circumstances must warrant an
inference that, at the time the official accepted one or more of the benefits
in the stream, he agreed at least implicitly to provide something in return.
The dangers of the watery metaphor are illustrated by a case I lost, that
of former Illinois governor George H. Ryan. The jury in Ryan’s case was
directed to convict him if he failed to disclose a conflict of interest, but after
the Supreme Court held in Skilling that failing to disclose a conflict of
95

A very clear illustration is United States v. Gorny, 732 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1984),
described in note supra.
96
McCormick, 500 U.S. at 283 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992) (“The offense is complete at the time when the public
official receives a payment in return for his engagement to perform specific official acts.”).

19

DEFINING BRIBERY

[January 26, 2015]

interest was no crime, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the jury must have
convicted him of taking bribes. The court focused particularly on the award
of a government contract to a lobbying client of co-defendant Lawrence
Warner. Warner was a political associate and family friend who had done
favors for Ryan and members of his family. The court quoted and approved
the district court’s conclusion that Ryan’s reason for approving the contract
must have been either to promote effective law enforcement, as he claimed,
or else
to compensate Warner for the stream of benefits he provided, as
the Government urged. The jury rejected the good faith motive.[97]
Accordingly, the jury could only have convicted him on this count
if it believed his conduct was a response to the stream of benefits.
. . . The court concludes that the jury must have found Ryan
accepted gifts from Warner with the intent to influence his
actions.98
The court spoke of “compensate[ing] Warner for the stream of benefits”
and of “accept[ing] gifts from Warner with the intent to influence [Ryan’s]
actions” as though they were the same thing. But the gifts obviously came
at an earlier point than the “compensation.” These gifts might have been
unconditional and legitimate even if they inspired gratitude and did prompt
later “compensation.” By equating subsequent favoritism for a benefactor
with bribery, the court concluded that the jury must have found bribery. Its
analysis placed every public official at risk.
IV. WHY DEFINITIONS OF BRIBERY SHOULD REMAIN UNDER-INCLUSIVE
For once, the Supreme Court has the law just right: “[F]or bribery, there
must be a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give or receive something in
exchange for an official act,”99 and campaign contributions may be treated
97

Under the instructions, the jury could have found a lack of good faith simply
because Ryan failed to disclose a conflict of interest, and it might have found nondisclosure of a conflict even if Ryan’s only reason for approving the contract was to
promote effective law enforcement. For present purposes, disregard that difficulty and
assume that the jury did reject Ryan’s claim that his only reason for approving the contract
was to advance the public good. Imagine that Ryan acted in whole or in part to benefit his
friend Warner and that the jury so found.
98
Ryan v. United States, 688 F.3d 845, 852 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ryan v. United
States, 759 F. Supp. 2d 975, 999 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 645 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2011),
vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012)).
99
Sun-Diamond Growers v. United States, 526 U.S 398, 404-05 (emphasis in the
original).

20

DEFINING BRIBERY

[January 26, 2015]

as bribes only when “the payments are made in return for an explicit
promise or undertaking . . . to perform or not to perform an official act.”100
In a concurring opinion one year after McCormick required an “explicit”
quid pro quo for campaign contributions alleged to be bribes, Justice
Kennedy objected to the Court’s requirement: “The official and the payor
need not state the quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the law’s
effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods.”101 As the reference
to winks and nods suggests, it grates that McCormick places a premium on
indirection. The Supreme Court has made achieving the functional
equivalent of bribery so easy that one may wonder why anyone ever resorts
to the real thing. The only thing that can be said for the Supreme Court’s
“explicit” quid pro quo requirement is that the alternative would be worse.
Whenever an elected official adheres to the positions that prompted
contributors to support him, he exhibits a pattern of favoritism for these
contributors. This pattern may bespeak conviction, not corruption.
Ambitious prosecutors and cynical jurors, however, can easily infer a
corrupt agreement from the common pattern. When an official has
supported widget subsidies after accepting large contributions from widget
manufacturers, for example, prosecutors and jurors may infer that there
must have been an implicit understanding. Allowing inferences of this sort
whenever officials have acted to benefit contributors could make public life
intolerable. One state has gone beyond McCormick by declaring that a
properly reported campaign contribution may not be treated as a bribe at
all.102 A narrow definition of bribery like McCormick’s reduces the
likelihood of “inferences” based on cynicism.
As a special prerogative of their position, law school teachers are
allowed to pose hypothetical cases that never could happen. I therefore
invite you imagine that the great philosopher Aristotle, resurrected from the
dead, is elected governor of New Jersey.
Unlike anyone who has actually been governor of New Jersey, Aristotle
gives no thought to his own welfare of that of his family, friends, and
supporters. He believes that “governments which rule with a view to the
private interest . . . are perversions.”103 Aristotle is incorruptible, and his
focus on the public good never falters.
But of course the inevitable happens. Many of Aristotle’s decisions
benefit people who have supported him politically, and others benefit
100

McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991).
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
102
Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 162.005, 162.015 (2011). Cf. Texas Penal Code § 36.02(a)(4)
(requiring “direct evidence of [an] express agreement” to “take or withhold a specific
exercise of official discretion” before a campaign contribution may be treated as a bribe).
103
See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 59 (Benjamin Jowett, tr.) (Forgotten Books ed. 2007).
101
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people who have done favors for him and members of his family. And when
the inevitable happens, critics point to Aristotle and say, “Aha! Behold! One
hand washes the other. We always knew that guy was no different from the
rest of them.”
The United States Attorney ultimately charges Aristotle with bribery,
extortion, honest services fraud, and racketeering. He says that Aristotle
accepted benefits that he must have known were intended to influence him
and, further, that he must have intended to be influenced. The prosecutor
adds that Aristotle failed to disclose the conflicts of interest created by
many of the benefits he received. He invites jurors to infer that there must
have been an unspoken understanding that Aristotle would reciprocate in
some unspecified way for the favors he received.
The jurors, many of whom entered the jury box with the conviction that
most politicians are corrupt,104 are astonished by the number of charges.
They convict on every count. The trial judge then lectures Aristotle on how
serious a wrong it is to betray the public trust. He sentences Aristotle to five
years, less than the 20 years proposed by the prosecutor.
Defense attorneys and public officials who have been convicted of
misconduct typically maintain that federal prosecutors can convict anyone
they like.105 The complaint sounds like an alibi, but broad definitions of
bribery bring it close to the truth. Whenever the law of bribery is not underinclusive, it is over-inclusive. There is no Goldilocks position. Indeed, the
law of bribery may be radically under-inclusive and radically over-inclusive
at the same time. It may leave many functional equivalents of bribery
untouched while sending Aristotle to prison. That’s the corruption dilemma.
V. EX ANTE REGULATIONS AND WHY THEY MUST BE UNDER-INCLUSIVE TOO
Zephyr Teachout writes, “Once corruption is understood as a
description of an emotional orientation, rather than a description of
contract-like exchange, the idea of criminalizing it seems either comical or
fascist.”106 Speaking of the kinds of rules commonly found in ethical codes
and campaign finance regulations, she observes, “The emotional nature of
corruption makes it better suited for bright-line rules that are unconcerned
with intent.”107
104

See text at notes infra.
See JAMES L. MERRINER, THE MAN WHO EMPTIED DEATH ROW: GOVERNOR
GEORGE RYAN AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME xi (2008) (quoting convicted former Member
of Congress Dan Rostenkowski); HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW
THE FEDS TARGET THE INNOCENT (2009).
106
TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 285.
107
Id. at 286. The rules to which Teachout refers are not entirely unconcerned with
105
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Teachout makes sense. It is only fair to tell officials and their
benefactors what they may and may not do before they act. Rather than
allow jurors to infer that Croesus, a wealthy industrialist, must have
intended to influence Solon, a state legislator, when he entertained Solon at
his ranch and gave him a $25,000 campaign contribution, the law should
tell Croesus and Solon in advance whether an industrialist may entertain a
legislator and make a $25,000 contribution. When corrupting benefits take
the form of campaign contributions, however, the Supreme Court has
largely blocked the most appropriate form of regulation, making expansion
of the bribery net more likely.108
Although Teachout’s position is sound and sensible, anyone who
attempts to draft a code of ethics for public officials will soon learn that this
code cannot block all functional equivalents of bribery. The range of
corrupting practices is wide—soliciting and accepting gifts, accepting
invitations to social events, accepting invitations to professional
conferences, accepting honoraria for speeches, accepting royalties for
publications, accepting referral fees, accepting investment advice,
participating in privately funded fact-finding missions, creating or lending
support to charities, owning stock and other passive investments, engaging
in remunerative employment or private business ventures, negotiating for
future private employment, accepting post-government employment, and
more.
Drawing appropriate lines is challenging. Should Croesus entertain
Solon less lavishly than his other friends, refusing to invite him to the ranch
but meeting him later at Denny’s? Must Solon, having accepted a public
trust, remain cloistered like the members of an ascetic religious order,
refusing to accept hospitality worth more than $50 even from old friends?
Would it be better just to require Solon to report as a gift any entertainment
intent. The intent they sometimes require, however, is simply an intent to cross the bright
lines they set forth. No speculation about deeper motivation is required.
108
For criticism of the Supreme Court’s failure to recognize that campaign
contributions are hybrids of protected speech and unprotected gifts to candidates and that
they differ greatly from other funds used to bring speech to audiences, see Albert W.
Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions After McCutcheon, Citizens United, and
SpeechNow, FLA. L. REV. (2015). The campaign finance restrictions the Supreme Court
held invalid in Buckley v, Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310 (2010), were in fact models of appropriate regulation. For the most part, they provided
specific, comprehensible rules, permitted people potentially affected by these rules to
obtain clarification through advisory opinions, were enforced primarily through civil
sanctions, and imposed criminal penalties only for willful violations. See Federal Election
Commission,
Quick
Answers
to
Compliance
Questions,
http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers_compliance.shtml (last visited Sept. 26, 2012); Federal
Election Commission, Advisory Opinions, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ao.shtml
(last visited Sept. 26, 2012).
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he receives worth more than $50?109
If Solon serves part-time as most do state legislators do,110 who may
patronize his law firm, insurance brokerage, or real estate agency? Who
may give his spouse, adult child, or niece a job? Who may contribute to his
favorite charity—or his spouse’s favorite charity? 111
Wherever the lines are drawn, people seeking favor are likely go beyond
109

Mandating disclosure is the regulation of easiest resort. As Omri Ben-Shahar and
Carl E. Schneider observe, “[T]he intervention is soft and leaves everything substantive
alone.” Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 681 (2011). This regulatory technique addresses a problem (or makes a
show of it) without notably affecting the public treasury. People burdened by the new
regulations often do not protest lest they be thought to have something to hide. More
information (and more and more) is thought to facilitate wiser decisions, although no one is
likely to read it. Ben-Shahar and Schneider conclude, “Mandated disclosure is a Lorelei,
luring lawmakers onto the rocks of regulatory failure.” Id. at 181.
To be sure, the utility of disclosure varies from one situation to the next. When
opponents, the press, and watchdog groups review the mandated disclosures of political
candidates and elected officials, they discover things the public should know. The
disclosures of candidates and elected officials often do not convey useful information,
however, see LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 1, at 251-60, and the disclosures of less
prominent public employees are likely to remain unread on the Internet and in file drawers.
Compliance with reporting requirements is also likely to be burdensome. Abner
Mikva, a former Member of Congress, former Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, former
White House counsel, and recent recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom, declared,
“[W]e already require the filing of too many forms. Every year all of our senior officials
spend countless hours filling out countless disclosure forms. . . . The reports are so
complicated that most reviewers can’t understand what they are reviewing, but they do
serve as wonderful traps to snare the unwary official.” Abner J. Mikva, From Politics to
Paranoia: Misguided Ethics Laws Have Given Us More Mistrust, Not Less, WASH. POST,
Nov. 26, 1995, at C2. Mikva observed, “[G]overnment cannot daily prove its rectitude to
the cynic convinced of government’s corruption.” Id.
110
See MARGARET ROBERTSON FERGUSON, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF STATE
GOVERNMENT: PEOPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS 191 (2006) (noting that the work of a state
legislator is a full-time job in only 11 states).
111
In Louisiana, Supriya Jindal created the Supriya Jindal Foundation for Louisiana’s
Children shortly after her husband, Bobby Jindal, became the state’s governor. The Jindal
Foundation provides high-tech equipment to schools, and Mrs. Jindal travels throughout
the state to deliver this equipment personally. One early contributor to the foundation was
AT&T, which gave $250,000. At about the same time, AT&T sought the governor’s
approval of an arrangement for providing television cable services. Marathon Oil, which
also gave $250,000, sought an increase in the amount of oil it could refine at its facility in
Louisiana. The governor’s press secretary said of the foundation, “It is a completely
nonpolitical, nonpartisan organization created by the first lady, who as an engineer and the
mother of three children, has a passion for helping our young people learn science and
math. Anything other than this reality has plainly been dreamed up by partisan hacks living
in a fantasy land.” See Eric Lipton, Charity Offers Corporate Tie to a Governor, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2011, at A1. See also Raymond Hernandez & David W. Chen, Keeping
Lawmakers Happy Through Gifts to Pet Charities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at A1.
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them. The authors of an ethical code may determine that the code should
not require the spouses, parents, children, nieces, nephews, and political
associates of public officials to refuse customary gifts and social invitations
or to decline ordinary business opportunities. This judgment, however, will
create an opening for favor-seekers. When people who may be interested in
doing business with the state send silver to family weddings and flowers to
family funerals, critics may howl about loopholes and functional
equivalents.112
The effect of ex ante regulation often may be to substitute weaker for
stronger conflicts of interest. In fact, giving a job to an officeholder’s
favorite nephew is usually not the functional equivalent of promising postgovernment employment to the officeholder himself. Although regulations
have hydraulic effects, one should not assume that they can neither reduce
the amount of money devoted to buying influence nor increase the cost of
buying it.113
The impossibility of suppressing all functional equivalents of bribery
though either corrupt-intent bribery laws or ex ante regulations may lead
one to say with Rutherford B. Hayes, “Law is no substitute for
character.”114 Hayes’s observation is noble and spot-on, but it may not be of
great comfort in a world in which all of us have been banished from the
Garden.
VI. FROM STEVENSON TO BLAGOJEVICH: HAS THE EFFORT TO CLEAN UP
GOVERNMENT THROUGH CRIMINAL PROSECUTION MADE THINGS BETTER?
Over the past 60 years, Congress has given prosecutors an ever-larger
arsenal of tools for fighting corruption.115 Although the Supreme Court has
112

The difficulty of drawing appropriate lines ex ante pushes regulators toward
employing fuzzy mental-state standards ex post. They may declare it permissible for
Croesus to entertain Solon at the ranch if Solon is in fact an old friend but impermissible if
Croesus is trying to influence Solon’s performance of his official duties.
113
But cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) ("[W]e think political money, like
water, has to go somewhere. It never really disappears into thin air."); McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (“Money, like water, will always find an outlet”).
114
Letter from Rutherford B. Hayes to Colonel G. Bickham (Dec. 5, 1888), in 4 DIARY
AND LETTERS OF RUTHERFORD BIRCHARD HAYES 426 (Charles R. Williams, ed., 1922).
115
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (the Travel Act, enacted in 1961); 18 U.S.C. §§ 19611968 (the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, enacted in 1970); 18
U.S.C. § 666 (the federal program bribery statute, enacted in 1984); 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (the
Money Laundering Control Act, enacted in 1986); 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (the honest services
statute, enacted in 1988); Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 903, 116 Stat. 745, 800 (2002) (part of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act) (increasing the maximum penalty for mail and wire fraud from 5 to
20 years). Although members of Congress speak of giving “tools” to prosecutors, they
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reined in the lower federal courts as best it can, these courts have construed
anti-corruption measures expansively. Corruption trials have become
longer. Every large United States Attorney’s Office has established a Public
Corruption Unit, and experienced prosecutors have competed for
assignments to this unit. In addition, the Justice Department has created a
Public Integrity Section staffed by “about 30 prosecutors who travel the
country to help local United States attorney’s offices develop complex and
often politically contentious corruption cases.”116 In 1976, federal
prosecutors indicted 337 officials for corruption, a five-fold increase from
the number six years earlier.117 The number of officials prosecuted annually
by the federal government today is about 800.118
Perhaps the federal effort to lock up public officials has given America
better and less corrupt government, but if it has, the public has not noticed.
The percentage of Americans who believe that “quite a few” government
officials are “crooked” has doubled in 50 years (from 24% in 1958 to 51%
in 2008),119 and the percentage of people who believe they can trust the
federal government most of the time has dropped by more than two-thirds
in 30 years (from 70% in 1980 to 22% in 2010).120 Forty-seven percent of
the public say that most members of Congress are corrupt (slightly more
than say that most are not corrupt).121 An impressionistic glance toward
seem never to speak of giving “tools” to defense attorneys.
116
Charlie Savage, Another High-Profile Failure for a Justice Dept. Watchdog, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2012, at A17.
117
See Charles F. C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in
the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1172 (1977) (citing U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Feb. 26, 1977, at 36).
118
See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 2012 at 24 & 25-26 Table 12,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pin/docs/2012-Annual-Report.pdf;
TRACREPORTS,
OFFICIAL
CORRUPTION
PROSECUTIONS
DECLINE
UNDER
OBAMA,
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/358/ (undated) (reporting somewhat lower figures than
those supplied by the Justice Department); Daniel H. Lowenstein, When is a Campaign
Contribution a Bribe?, in PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION 127, 129 Tbl. 6.1 (William C.
Heffernan and John Lowenstein eds. 2004). The high-water mark came in 1991 when the
federal government prosecuted almost 1200 officials. Id.
119
See LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 1, at 167 (citing New Judicial
Watch/Zogby Poll: “81.7% of Americans Say Political Corruption Played a ‘Major Role’
in Financial Crisis”, JUDICIAL WATCH, Oct. 21, 2008).
120
Id. (citing THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT:
DISTRUST, DISCONTENT, ANGER AND PARTISAN RANCOR (April 18, 2010), available at
http://people-press.org/http://people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/606.pdf,
and
JEFFREY
BIRNBAUM, THE MONEY MEN: THE REAL STORY OF FUND-RAISING’S INFLUENCE ON
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 10 (2000)).
121
Joseph Carroll, Americans Increasingly View Most Members of Congress as
Corrupt,
Gallup
News
Service,
May
17,
2006,
available
at
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today’s public officials may also suggest that the effort to improve
government by locking up officials has misfired. My home state, Illinois,
has gone within my memory from Governor Adlai Stevenson to Governor
Rod Blagojevich.
The Stevenson-to-Blagojevich observation may provoke your own
impressionistic assessment, but I confess that it is a rhetorical ploy. Most
public officials were not as virtuous as Adlai Stevenson 60 years ago, and
few are as lacking in character as Rod Blagojevich today.
In 1948, the year Stevenson was elected governor, the election of a
Democratic majority in the Illinois House made Representative Paul Powell
a leading candidate to become Speaker of the House. Powell famously
remarked on election night, “I can smell the meat a’cookin.”122 Powell did
become Speaker and later Secretary of State, and when he died in 1970,
people found $800,000 in cash in shoeboxes, briefcases, and strongboxes in
his Springfield hotel suite. They also found 49 cases of whiskey, 14
transistor radios, and two cases of creamed corn. Although Powell’s salary
never exceeded $30,000 per year, he left an estate worth $4.1 million. One
million dollars of it consisted of racetrack stock.123
Your speculation about whether federal corruption prosecutions have
made things better or worse is as good as mine. My own guess, however, is
“both.” My sense is that officials like Powell have become less common
than they were 60 years ago, and so have officials like Stevenson. Federal
corruption prosecutions may have played a part in both stories.
Although the F.B.I. found $90,000 in cash in Congressman William
Jefferson’s freezer in 2005,124 corruption prosecutions today rarely involve
shoeboxes stuffed with cash or offshore bank accounts. The officials who
wind up in prison are likely to be figures like Alabama Governor Don
Siegelman, accused of agreeing to appoint someone to a state board in
exchange for financial support of a program to generate education funds,125
and Robert Sorich, a Chicago mayoral aide accused of patronage hiring in
violation of a civil consent decree.126 The public’s greater mistrust of public
http://www.gallup.com/poll/22837/americans-increasingly-view-most-members-congresscorrupt.aspx. See also INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, SURVEY OF YOUNG
AMERICANS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICS AND PUBLIC SERVICE (23d edition 2013),
http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/spring_poll_13_Exec_Summary.pdf.
122
See MERRIMER, supra note , at 17.
123
See
Paul
Powell
(politician),
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Powell_(politician) (last visited Jan. 8, 2015).
124
See Jerry Markon, Jefferson Gets 13 Years in Bribe Case: Former Congressman
Renowned for $90,000 F.B.I. Found in Freezer, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2009, at A2.
125
See United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2011).
126
See United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008); Sorich v. United States,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86213 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
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officials may reflect changed standards or simply a more resentful mood
rather than either the officials’ changed behavior or the public’s changed
perception of what they do.127
If shoeboxes full of cash are indeed rarer today, perhaps the reason is
that public officials and their corruptors now have more class. They may
have learned that campaign contributions and other “functional
equivalents,” even if not “equivalent,” are plenty good enough. Cash bribes
may have become infrequent not only because they are criminal but also
because they are unnecessary. I am inclined to believe, however, that
deterrence through criminal punishment has played a part.128
Deterring bribery is an excellent idea, but deterring Adlai Stevenson
from running for office is not. Federal corruption prosecutions might have
made twenty-first century Stevensons less likely to enter politics for two
reasons.
First, these prosecutions reflect and reinforce the dark view of
politicians voiced by economists, taxi drivers, and radio talk-show callers.
When office-holders are presumed corrupt, many virtuous people may find
the game not worth playing. Daniel Patrick Moynihan commented,
“[P]olitics, business, and war have ever been the affairs of adventurers and
risk takers,”129 and Moynihan’s observation may be especially true today.
The adventurers still attracted to the game may be more likely than today’s
Adlai Stevensons to cut corners. Criminal prosecutions probably have
contributed to rather than ameliorated the public’s sense that most
politicians are “crooked.”
Second, corruption prosecutions reinforce the sense that running for
office means entering a world of sharpened knives. Although a twenty-first
century Stevenson might not be concerned that seeking office could land
him in the cell next to Aristotle’s, he could not avoid noticing that to enter
127

Few public officials banish altogether from their thoughts and actions the impulse
to aid friends and supporters and to encourage further support. Unfortunate though their
favoritism may be, even the best officials are likely to give friends and supporters a leg up.
This conduct once did not spark moral indignation. When cronyism went too far and
appeared to compromise the public interest, political opponents might complain; people
might call for more civil service reform or competitive bidding; and voters might fail to
reelect an official. But no one seemed to demand long prison terms.
128
When I wrote an article about the prosecution of former Illinois governor George
Ryan, my goal was to criticize the overreach of Congress, federal prosecutors, and the
courts, not to advance the cause of effective law enforcement. See Albert W. Alschuler,
The Mail Fraud & Rico Racket: Thoughts on the Trial of George Ryan, 9 GREEN BAG 2D
113 (2006). Someone told me, however, that the Speaker of the Illinois House had
circulated copies of my article to his staff along with a note asking them to notice how easy
it is to get in trouble. If the story is true, it illustrates deterrence in action.
129
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, When the Irish Ran New York, CITY JOURNAL, Spring
1993 (available at http://www.city-journal.org/article02.php?aid=1499).
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politics is to enter a jungle. Candidates today must not only be wary of the
knives of others but also consider how sharp a knife to wield themselves. A
present day Stevenson might well conclude that, if he wants to be
successful, he cannot remain Adlai Stevenson. Although journalists,
political consultants, and politicians have done more than prosecutors to
make politics a game of gotcha, prosecutors have played a part.130
VII. CONCLUSION
Government corruption stirs resentment. It unites almost everyone,
including members of both the Occupy Wall Street and Tea Party
movements. When public officials and their benefactors can engage in
130

The Justice Department censured U.S. Attorney Thomas DiBiagio after a
newspaper learned of memoranda he had sent his staff. DiBiagio told his subordinates that
he wanted three “front page” white collar or public corruption indictments by November 6,
a date close to election day. See Editorial, A Vote of No Confidence, WASH. POST, July 20,
2004, at A16, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A630692004Jul19.html. In view of the incentives of the U.S. Attorney’s office, one commentator
expressed surprise that anyone was surprised. See George D. Brown, Carte Blanche:
Federal Prosecution of State and Local Officials after Sabri, 54 CATH. U.L. REV. 403, 403
(2005).
When a Justice Department task force examined the removal of nine United States
Attorneys during the administration of President George W. Bush, it found evidence that
some had been encouraged to file prosecutions for political reasons. In what was probably
the most egregious case, the task force documented a stream of phone calls and other
communications from Republican office holders and party officials to David Iglesias, the
United States Attorney for the District of New Mexico. The communications encouraged
faster and more vigorous prosecution of Democrats in two corruption cases and a voting
fraud case.
A call late in the series came on October 26, 2006, shortly before the elections of that
year. In an apparent reference to one of the corruption cases, U.S. Senator Pete Domenici
asked whether he could expect an indictment before November. Iglesias answered that he
did not think so. Domenici said, “Well, I’m very sorry to hear that,” and hung up.
On Election Day, November 7, Domenici’s Chief of Staff wrote in an email to the
President’s Deputy Chief of Staff and Senior Advisor Karl Rove, “We worry still about the
USA here.” At a White House meeting one week later, Heather Wilson, a Republican
Member of Congress, remarked to Rove that “the U.S. Attorney in New Mexico is a waste
of breath.” Rove replied, “That decision has already been made. He’s gone.”
On December 7, a deputy White House counsel informed Senator Domenici’s office
that Iglesias would be asked to resign. The counsel then emailed a Justice Department
official that “Domenici’s COS [Chief of Staff] is happy as a clam.” Another Justice
Department official requested Iglesias’s resignation the same day. See U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 190200 (2008).
Even when prosecutors are not partisan and are not subject to outside pressure, they
are likely to view a state’s governor in the same way a big game hunter views a cape
buffalo.
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practices that resemble bribery and escape punishment, people get angry.
Nearly everyone appears to favor broader anti-corruption laws. They may
assume that the only reason these laws don’t exist already is that lawmakers
are corrupt and want to stay that way.
This article has argued, however, that broader anti-corruption laws
generally make things worse. It has traced the history of two competing
concepts of bribery—the “intent to influence” concept and the “illegal
contract” concept—and it has taken the language of various definitions of
bribery more seriously than this language often has been taken.
“Intent to influence” may be an appropriate standard when applied to
benefits given to appointed judges (both in the seventeenth century and
today), but it is a preposterous standard when applied in the twenty-first
century to people who must collect donations to run for office and who are
appropriately subject to persuasion in a wide variety of social settings
bearing little resemblance to a courtroom. The “illegal contract” concept is
more appropriate.
Although the Supreme Court’s refusal to treat campaign contributions as
bribes in the absence of an “explicit” quid pro quo is easily criticized
(“That’s not how it’s done!”), inviting inferences of criminal behavior
whenever the actions of elected officials have benefitted donors to their
campaigns would be worse. The Supreme Court has appropriately rebuffed
efforts to use a statute criminalizing deprivations of “the intangible right of
honest services” to scuttle the quid pro quo requirement. Moreover,
although the currently fashionable “stream of benefits” metaphor can be
compatible with the “illegal contract” concept of bribery, courts should not
allow talk of streams, retainers, meal plans, and open bars to degenerate into
a “one hand washes the other” or “favoritism” standard.
Broad definitions of bribery not only sweep into their net common and
widely accepted behavior. They also invite unjustified inferences and
empower prosecutors to pick their targets. Most people, however, toot only
one horn of the corruption dilemma.
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